Abstract. Despite the reputed limitations of first order logic, it is easy to state and prove almost all interesting properties of recursive programs within a simple first order theory, by using an approach we call "first order programming logic". Unlike higher order logics based on fixed-point induction, first order programming logic is founded on deductive principles that are familiar to most programmers. Informal structural induction arguments (such as termination proofs for LISP append, McCarthy's 91-function, and Ackermann's function) have direct formalizations within the system.
1. Introduction. It is a widely accepted part of computer science folklore that first order logic is too limited a formalism for stating and proving the interesting properties of recursive programs. Hitchcock and Park [16] , for example, claim that the termination (totality) of a recursively defined function on a data domain D cannot be expressed by a sentence in a first order theory of D augmented by the recursive definition. As a result of this criticism, most researchers developing programming logics for recursive programs have rejected first order logic in favor of more complex higher order systems, e.g., Milner [19] , [20] , [21] , Park [23] , deBakker [11] , Gordon et al. [15] , Scott and deBakker [25] , Scott [26] , deBakker and deRoever [12] . Nevertheless, we will show that a properly chosen, axiomatizable first order theory is a natural programming logic for recursive programs. In fact, we will present evidence which suggests that first order logic may be a more appropriate formalism for reasoning about specific recursive programs than higher order logics.
2. Logical preliminaries. As a foundation for the remainder of the paper, we briefly summarize the important definitions and notational conventions of first order logic. Readers who are unfamiliar with the fundamental concepts of first order predicate calculus are encouraged to consult Enderton's excellent introductory text [14] .
In first order programming logic, recursive definitions are expressed within a conventional first order logical language L with equality determined by a countable set of function symbols G, a countable set of predicate symbols R, and an associated "arity" function 4 A formula with elided parentheses abbreviates the fully parenthesized formula generated by giving unary connectives precedence over binary ones, ranking binary connectives in order of decreasing precedence: {^} > {v, } > {=} > {=}, and associating adjacent applications of connectives of equal precedence to the right. For the sake of clarity, we will occasionally substitute square brackets {[, ]} for parentheses within formulas. In place of a sentence, a formula a abbreviates the sentence V3a where 7 is a list of the free variables of a. Similarly, the forms Vx'p a and t'p, where p is a unary predicate symbol, abbreviate the formulas /x[p(x) a] and p(t), respectively. Let S denote a (possibly empty) set of function and predicate symbols (with associated arities) not in the language L. Then L U $ denotes the first order language determined by the function and predicate symbols of L augmented by S; L U S is called an expansion of L.
Although logicians occasionally treat first order logic as a purely syntactic system (the subject of proof theory), we are interested in what terms and formulas mean. The meaning of a first order language L is formalized as follows. A structure M compatible with L is a triple ([M[, Mr;, M) [17] . Of course, every first order deductive system that is sound and complete derives exactly the same set of sentences. In this paper, we will leave the choice of deductive system unspecified, since we are not interested in the syntactic details of formal proofs. In our examples, we will present proofs in informal (yet rigorous) [2] , asserts that a set $ of functions and predicates over IAI is implicitly definable in T if[ it is explicitly definable in T. Hence, we are justified in dropping the modifiers "implicitly" and "explicitly" when discussing the issue of definability in a theory.
In first order programming logic, we formalize data domains as structures in first order logic. In this context, a recursive program is simply a particular form of logical definition over the data domain. Before proceeding with the development of the formal theory, we will first examine and refute a widely accepted argument asserting that first order logic is incapable of expressing and proving that functions defined in recursive programs are total.
3. ltitchcock and Park's critique of first order logic. As motivation for developing a higher order logic for reasoning about recursive programs, Hitchcock and Park 16] claim that first order logic is too weak to express and prove that the functions defined in a recursive program are total. As justification, they consider the following recursive program over the natural numbers:
(1) zero (n) IF n 0 THEN 0 ELSE zero n 1
where IF-THEN-ELSE is interpreted as a logical connective (as in reference [17] ). This program (1) can be expressed within the usual language of first order number theory (eliminating the special IF-THEN-ELSE connective) by the sentence" (2) Vn[(n=Ozero(n)=O)^(n#Ozero(n)=zero(n-1))].
While they concede that it is very easy to prove informally by induction that the zero function is total on the natural numbers they claim that no sentence provable in a first order theory of the natural numbers augmented by (2) can state that zero is total. To justify this claim, they propose the following argument.
Let N denote the structure consisting of the natural numbers, the constants (0-ary functions) {0, 1}, the binary functions {+, ,-} and the binary predicates {=, <}. By the upward Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, the theory (set of true sentences) of N has a nonstandard model N that is a proper extension of N. The additional objects in the universe I1 are "nonstandard" natural numbers that are greater than all standard integers (the elements of the universe INI). Hitchcock logic, just as it does in higher order logics such as LCF [15] , [19] , [20] , [21] . If [5] or Vuillemin [28] . Although continuity ensures that recursive programs are well-defined, it does not guarantee that they can be implemented on a machine. For this reason, program data domains typically satisfy several additional constraints which we lump together under the label arithmeticity. The most important difference between an arithmetic domain and a continuous domain is that the former must be finitely generated. First order programming logic critically depends on this property, because it presumes that the domain obeys the principle of structural induction. The remaining properties that distinguish arithmetic domains from continuous ones (items (i) and (iii) With the exception of the induction principle (*) appearing in property (ii), the preceding list of conditions on D can be formally expressed by a finite set of sentences in the language Lr). The induction principle (*) cannot be expressed in Lo, because it asserts that induction holds for all unary predicatesman uncountable set with many members that cannot be defined within LD. We will explore this issue in depth in 7. Fortunately, confining our attention to arithmetic data domains does not significantly limit the applicability of first order programming logic. With the exception of domains including an extensional treatment of higher order data objects (such as functions), the data domain of any plausible recursive programming language has a natural formalization as an arithmetic structure. At the end of this section, we will discuss how to extend an arbitrary, finitely generated domain D excluding _L to form an arithmetic domain D' with universe ID] {+/-}.
Before we state and prove the fundamental theorem of first order programming logic, we must resolve a subtle issue concerning the status of induction in arithmetic domains that are augmented by definitions. Formalizing induction in first order logic requires an axiom scheme" a template with a free formula parameter. The scheme represents the infinite recursive set of sentences consisting of all possible instantiations of the template. Let 1) be a structure that is finitely generated by the function symbols Gen {g,..., g}. Obviously, the corresponding induction principle (*) holds in D.
In a first order axiomatization AD for D, we typically include the following axiom scheme formalizing the induction principle (*) (**) [
where (x) is an arbitrary formula in LD defining a unary predicate. The scheme asserts that structural induction holds for every definable unary predicate in the domain. Any structure satisfying the structural induction scheme (**) is called an inductive domain with generator set Gen. The only difference between an inductive domain and a finitely generated domain is that induction may fail in an inductive domain for predicates that are not definable.
When we augment a finitely generated domain D by a definition A introducing new function and predicate symbols S, how should we interpret the induction scheme? Does the formula parameter in the scheme range over formulas in the augmented language or formulas in the original language? Assuming that we are interested in constructing the strongest possible theory for the expanded structure, the answer to the question is clear. Since the universe of the expanded structure is identical to the universe of the original domain, the induction scheme must hold for all predicates that are definable in ttie expanded structure (using the augmented language). Consequently, we follow the convention that a definition A over a finitely generated domain Proof. By Kleene's recursion theorem [27] fiat (x) fiat 1 (x, NIL) flatl (x, y)=if atom x then cons (x, y) else flatl (car x, flatl (cdr x, y)).
The function fiat returns a linear "in-order" list of the atoms appearing in the S-expression x. For example
C). B)]= (A C B).
We want to prove that flat1 (x, y) terminates for arbitrary S-expressions x and y (obviously implying flat (x) is total for all S-expressions x). In the theory of Sexpressions augmented by {_t_}, we can formally state and prove this property in the following way, given that Sexpr (x) abbreviates the formula x _t_.
THEOREM. VX, y'Sexpr [flatl (x, y)'Sexpr].
Term rewriting systems for recursive programs have been extensively investigated by Cadiou [4] , Vuillemin [28] , [29] , Rosen [24] , Downey and Sethi [13] , and O'Donnell [22] , but not in the context of first order theories of program data. The following formulation of first order computation is a distillation and adaptation of the work of Cadiou [5] and Vuillemin [28] , [29] Proof. A proof of this theorem, an induction on the complexity of t, appears in [9] ; proofs of similar theorems appear in [4] and [26] . [3 To avoid confusion between the call-by-name and call-by-value interpretations for recursive programs, we will use the following terminology. Unless we specifically use the qualifier "call-by-value", the intended meaning of a program P defining the function symbols F is the least fixed-point of the (call-by-name) functional P for Pmthe call-by-name interpretation for F. In contrast, the intended meaning of a call-by-value program P is the least fixed-point of the call-by-value functional P I for Pmthe call-by-value interpretation for F. [7] .
Call-by-value programs are an attractive alternative to call-by-name programs because they are easier to implement and programmers seem more comfortable with Nevertheless, there is a simple counterexample to this conjecture. Consider the following program defined over a nonstandard model gl 7 of the natural numbers augmented by _t_ (axiomatized as in Appendix I): (7) zero(n) if n equal 0 then 0 else zero(n 1). This program is essentially identical to the one that Hitchcock and Park [16] used to argue that first order logic was incapable of expressing and proving that the function defined by (7) is total. The least fixed-point of the corresponding functional is the function zero defined by:
f0 if x is a standard natural number, zero(x) _1_ otherwise (x is _t_ or nonstandard). Yet, we have already established the fact in refuting Hitchcock and Park's argument ( 3 and Appendix II) that we can prove (using structural induction) that the zero function defined in equation (7) is identically zero everywhere except at _1_.
Clearly, our naive approach to generalizing the proof of the fundamental theorem to nonstandard models will not work. Our assumption that a recursive program P over a weakly arithmetic structure D' can be interpreted as a definition introducing a set of functions F' that (i) forms the least fixed-point of the functional for P, and (ii) obeys the structural induction principle (**) leads to a contradiction. Where did we go wrong?
Ironically, we made essentially the same mistake as Hitchcock and Park: we assumed that a recursive program over a nonstandard structure should be interpreted as the least fixed-point of the corresponding functional. In the preceding example, the least fixed-point of the functional for equation (7) over N is not definable in N. For this reason, it need not obey the structural induction principle.
In order to generalize the fundamental theorem to nonstandard models, we must develop a more sophisticated interpretation for recursive programs than the least fixed-point of the corresponding functional. Since first order programming logic formalizes recursive programs as arithmetic definitions over the data domain, we must find an interpretation for recursive programs over nonstandard models that satisfies the structural induction principle. From the preceding example, it is obvious that the least fixed-point interpretation does not. What is a reasonable alternative? For induction to hold, the interpretation must be definable in the original domain D. Hence, we must limit our attention to definable fixed-points of the functional for a recursive program--abandoning our reliance on the familiar least fixed-point construction from Kleene's recursion theorem. In its place, we must develop a new approach to constructing fixed-points of functionals that always determines definable functions.
A model containing an element with infinitely many predecessors.
A detailed, systematic development of the subject of definable fixed-points is beyond the scope of this paper (the interested reader is encouraged to consult reference [10] In the standard model D, the formulas tl(gl, y),''', n(gn, y) characterize the least fixed-point of P. What do they mean in the weakly arithmetic model D'? From T, we can prove that the n-tuple of functions [fl,... ,Vn] determined by l()n, y),''', bn(gn, y) satisfies the definition P. Moreover, given another collection of formulas 0(g, y),..., ,(g,, y) determining an n-tuple of functions [,..., 'n] over ID'l.that satisfies the definition P, we can prove that [tl,..., V,,] approximates [i,..., f'] . Hence, the n-tuple of functions determined by 1 (.1, y) ,''', n(,n, y) must be the least definable-fixed-point of P'. [q Given the generalized recursion theorem, the following generalization of the fundamental theorem is a simple consequence.
THEOREM (generalized fundamental theorem). Let P be a recursive program {fl(.'l) t,, f2(2) t2,""", f,(,)= t,} over a weakly arithmetic domain D' supporting 
where D'f denotes the structure D't.J F' and s is an arbitrary state over ID'fl. By the same construction used in the proof of the generalized recursion theorem, every formula over D'f can be translated into an equivalent formula over D'. Consequently, the induction principle (**) holds for all formulas over D', implying D'f is a model for P t_J (**) extending D'. [3 8 . Construction of complete recursive programs. In this section, we will show how to construct a complete recursive program P* equivalent to a given call-by-value program P. We will also verify that the constructed program P* actually is complete and equivalent to P. We relegate the analogous construction and proof for call-by-name programs to Appendix III, since they are similar but somewhat more complex.
The intuitive idea underlying the construction is to define for each function f in the original call-by-value program a corresponding function f* such that f*(xl," , xn) constructs the computation sequence for the call-by-value evaluation of f(xl,. , Xn).
In fact, constructing the actual computation sequence really is not necessary; the values of the elements in the sequence, except for the final one (the value of f(x,:.., xn)), are irrelevant. It is the expanding structure of the sequence that is significant, because it prevents an arbitrary fixed-point solution from filling in points where the computed (least) fixed-point diverges.
For example, consider the trivial program (8) f(x) =if x equal 0 then 0 else f(g(x)) over the domain of LISP S-expressions where g is any unary function with fixed-points (i.e., g(y)=y for some S-expression y). The corresponding functional obviously has multiple fixed-points, although the intended meaning of the definition is the least fixed-point f. If we define f* by the program (9) f*(x) =if x equal 0 then cons (0, NIL) else cons (g(x), f*(g(x))), then f* constructs a sequence containing the argument for each call on f in the call-by-value evaluation of f(x), assuming that f(x) terminates. If f(x) does not terminate (e.g., g(x) x), then every fixed-point f* of the functional for definition (9) must be undefined (_1_) at x. Otherwise, f*(x) has length greater than any integer which contradicts the fact that every sequence in the data domain is finite. 8 Given (9), we can redefine f by the recursion equation (10) f(x) last (f*(x))
where last is the standard LISP function that extracts the final element in a list. Now, by substituting the definition consisting of equations (9) and (10) If1,"" ", f,] denote the least fixed-point of the call-by-value functional P+/-for P. The complete recursive program P* equivalent to P has the following properties:
(i) P* is complete, i.e. the corresponding call-by-value functional P has a unique fixed-point Ill*,""", f*].
(ii) For i= 1,..., n, last(i*(a)) fi(a)) for all fi-tuples overlO]. Proof. See Appendix III.
The corresponding theorem for call-by-name programs and a sketch of its proof appear in Appendix IV.
The fixed-point normalization theorem has an important corollary relating complete recursive programs to first order theories. In informal terms, the corollary asserts that a complete recursive program over an arithmetic domain D is an unambiguous, arithmetic definition augmenting a suitable first order theory for D (a theory closely resembling Peano arithmetic9).
COROLLARY. Let Ao be an arithmetically complete first order axiomatization for the arithmetic domain D. Then for every call-by-value program P over D, the equivalent complete recursive program P* (expressed in the form P*ax) is an unambiguous, arithmetic definition augmenting Ao [-J Elem. Proof. The key idea underlying the proof of the corollary is to generalize the fixed-point normalization theorem to cover programs defined over weakly arithmetic (not just arithmetic) domains. Since all the models of Ao LI Elem are weakly arithmetic, the generalized normalization theorem implies that Pa*x determines a unique expansion of every model of Ao t.J Elem--immediately establishing the corollary.
The only obstacle to extending the fixed-point normalization theorem to weakly arithmetic domains is the same complication that we encountered in generalizing the fundamental theorem of first order programming logic in 7: the least fixed-point of the functional corresponding to a recursive program may not be definable. We overcame this problem in 7 by substituting the notion of least definable fixed-point for the standard notion of least fixed-point. The same strategy works here.
TIaEOREM (generalized fixed point normalization theorem). Let The first order theory generated by Peano's axioms for the natural numbers.
(i) P* is complete, i.e. the corresponding call-by-value functional P has a unique definable-fixed-point [t*,. ., (if) For i= 1,..., n, last (t*())= fi(a)) for all f-tuples over IDI.
Proof. The proof of the generalized fixed-point normalization theorem is essentially identical to the proof of the original one, except that it must invoke the generalized recursion theorem described in 7 instead of Kleene's recursion theoremwsubstituting the notion of least definable-fixed-point for least fixed-point. We will use the term extended first order programming logic for P to refer to conventional first order programming logic for P augmented by Elem (the definition of functions Seq), the axioms defining the equivalent complete program P*, and the axioms asserting that each function f is identical to last f*. (11) f(x)=f(x+l).
We want to prove the following theorem.
Proof. Although the intended meaning of f (the least fixed-point of the functional for the program (11) Proof. We prove the lemma by structural induction on the (possibly 3_) sequence *(x).
Basis: f x 3_.
In this case, the theorem is true by assumption. 
We wish to prove the following formal theorem.
Proof. By simplification, the theorem trivially reduces to the statement (12) Vx[whileA (f(x))= repeatB (x)]. If f(x) is not total, this statement is not provable in conventional first order programming logic, because the recursive definitions of whileA and repeatB may have extraneous fixed-points. However, in extended first order programming logic, the proof is straightforward. Given the equivalent complete programs whileA* (x) ,-if p(x) then mkseq (x) else cons (x, whileA* (f(x))) repeatB* (x),-if p(f(x)) then mkseq (f(x)) else cons (x, repeatB* (f(x))) and the axioms (from extended first order programming logic)
cons (x, y)= mkseq (x) y last (mkseq (x)) x x _L last (cons (x, y)) last (y) whileA (x)= last (whileA* (x)) repeatB (x)= last (repeatB* (x)) relating the complete program to the original one, statement (12) reduces to the sentence: (13) ''x[last (whileA* (f(x)) last (repeatB* (x))].
As in higher order logics based on fixed-point induction (e.g., Edinburgh LCF), the proof of (13) The proof of (13a) proceeds as follows.
First, we can assume that last (whileA* (f(x)))#_L; otherwise, (13a) trivially holds. Given this assumption and the fact that last is strict (which follows immediately from the definition of last), we can apply structural induction on whileA* (f(x)). As the induction hypothesis we assume that last (whileA* (f(x')))_ last (repeatB* (x'))
for all x' such that whileA* ([(x')) is a proper subtail of whileA* (f(x)). By the definition of while/k*, while/k* (f(x)) =if p(f(x)) then mkseq (f(x)) else cons (f(x), while/k* (f(f(x)))).
A three-way case analysis on the value of p(f(x)) completes the proof of (13a). Case (a) . p(.f(x)) D+/-. In this case, whileA* (](x))= _L, which is a contradiction.
Case (b) . p(f(x)) Otrue.
By simplification, last (while/k* (f(x)))=f(x) and last (repeatB* (x))=f(x) establishing (13a). Case (c) . e(f(x)) Dfalse.
Obviously, whileA* (f(x))= cons (f(x), whileA* (f(f(x)))) and repeatB* (x)=cons ([(x), repeatB* (f(x))) implying that whileA* (f(f(x))) is shorter than whileA* (f(x)). Consequently, the induction hypothesis holds for x'= f(x), yielding the following chain of simplifications: last (whileA* (f(x)))= last (cons (f(x), whileA* (f(f(x))))) last (whileA* (f(f(x)))) last (repeatB* (f(x))) (by induction) last (repeatB* (x)), which proves (13a).
Since the proof of (13b) As an illustration, consider the sample proof presented in 5" the termination of the recursive program fiat. The proof using first order programming logic is a direct translation of the obvious informal proof. In contrast, a proof of the same theorem in Edinburgh LCF (or similar higher order logic) must introduce a retraction characterizing the domain of S-expressions and simulate structural induction by performing fixed-point induction on the retraction. In the fixed-point induction step, the programmer (or theorem prover) must check that the formula is admissible (by applying the syntactic test) before applying the rule.
For the reasons cited above, we believe that first order programming logic--rather than a higher order logic--is the appropriate formal system for proving properties of recursive programs. Both Boyer and Moore [3] , [4] and Cartwright [6] , [7] [k =>0}. cannot reach a firm conclusion until we build a machine implementation and experiment with various schemes for translating arbitrary programs into complete ones.
12. Related and future research. A group of Hungarian logicians--Andreka, Nemeti, and Sain--have independently developed a programming logic 1 with metamathematical properties similar to first order programming logic, although the pragmatic details are completely different. Their logic formalizes flowchart programs as predicate definitions within a first order theory of the data domain excluding _L. Given a flowchart program P, they generate a formula re(x, y) that is true (in the standard model of the data domain) iff y is the output produced by applying program P to input x. In contrast to first order programming logic, the notion of computation embedded in their logic applies to all models of the data domain theory. 11 We are confident that an analogous result holds for first order programming logic; we intend to formulate and prove it in a subsequent paper. As a formal system for reasoning about recursive programs, the major limitation of first order programming logic as formulated in this paper is that it does not accommodate "higher order" data domains--structures that are not fiat. f91(n) =if n> 100 then n-10 else f91(f91(n + 11)).
We will prove the following theorem implying f91 is total over the integers.
THEOREM. fn[n _L f91(n) =if n > 100 then n-10 else 91].
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on 101 n where the binary operator (monus) is defined by the equation x y if (x-y) > 0 then x-y else 0.
Basis: 101 n O.
Clearly, n > 100, implying f91 (n) n 10, which is exactly what the theorem asserts.
Induction step: 101 n > O.
By hypothesis, we assume the theorem holds for n' such that 101 n' < 101 < n, i.e. n'> n. By the definition of f91, f91(n)=f91(f91(n+ll))=f91(if n+ll > 100 then n+l else 91) (by induction since n + 11 > n).
By assumption, n <-100. Consequently, there are two cases we must consider.
Case a). n + 11 > 100.
Obviously, 100 -> n > 89, implying f91(n)=f91(n+l)=if n+l> 100 then n-9 else 91=91 (since n=< 100).
Case (b). n + 11 <= 100. By assumption, n <= 89, implying f91(n) =f91 (91) (ii) For i= 1,..., n, last(i*(aT))= ii(aT) for all # f-tuples over IDI. Let D (k) (i) P* is complete, i.e. the corresponding (call-by-name) functional P* has a unique fixed-point [f,. ., f.*].
(ii) For i= 1,..., n, last (f*(mkseq (dl),. ,mkseq (dr,)))-fi() for all 4f- for the call-by-name program P* over D* analogous to D
